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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-2918
________________
P.R., Individually and o/b/o S.H. and F.R.;
JENNIFER BARNES, Individually; 
JOSHUA RIDGEWAY, Individually
 v.
BRIDGETON BOARD OF EDUCATION
    **Providence Ridgeway; Jennifer Barnes; 
*Joshua Ridgeway,
             Appellants
     *(Dismissed per Clerk's Order of 10/25/06)
    **(Dismissed per Clerk's Order of 10/26/06)
______________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-00042)
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
October 26, 2006
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed December 6, 2006)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
PER CURIAM
    1 Also attached was Edmonson’s resume, as well as an affidavit summarizing her
services for the plaintiffs.  Although her resume indicates that she has an M.B.A. degree,
it does not indicate that she holds a law degree or is a member of the bar.
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Pro se appellant Jennifer Barnes appeals the order of the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing her civil action under Rule 41(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Upon careful review of the record, we will dismiss the
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The background of this case is set forth in detail in the District Court’s opinions
and orders, so we will recount the facts in summary fashion.  The plaintiffs initiated an
action in District Court by filing a complaint pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415, seeking payment of fees and costs of their
educational consultant and advocate, Total Envolvement, as a prevailing party in
administrative proceedings.  Attached to the complaint, among other things, was an
itemization of services rendered by Tracee Edmonson, with fees totaling $123,687.50, at
an hourly rate of $250.1  The action was brought pro se, but the plaintiffs’ mailing address
listed on their documents was that of Total Envolvement.  The defendant, the Bridgeton
Board of Education (“Board”) filed an answer to the complaint and asserted various
defenses, including the assertion that the plaintiffs’ action was not prepared by the pro se
plaintiffs but instead “by lay advocate Tracee Edmonson who continues to engage in the
unauthorized practice of law.”  The defendant also contested whether lay advocacy costs
were compensable under the IDEA, and whether the hours spent and the hourly rate were
3reasonable.
Cross-motions for summary judgment followed.  On January 31, 2006, the District
Court denied without prejudice both motions for summary judgment and ordered the
parties and Edmonson to appear for a hearing on February 23, 2006, for questioning
under oath regarding the preparation of the motion papers and pleadings purportedly filed
pro se.  On February 14, 2006, the plaintiffs and Edmonson submitted a response to the
order, indicating that none of them would appear for the hearing, stating that the
“preparation of these motion papers and pleadings has no bearing on whether we
prevailed in the administrative matter or on seeking allowable fees and costs” (internal
quotations omitted).  The response further indicated that they viewed the order as
assisting the defense in its position, and that the District Court would have to decide the
case “without [their] participation.”  The District Court responded by faxing a letter on
February 21, 2006, clarifying its order and again ordering the plaintiffs’ and Edmonson’s
appearance at the hearing, warning them that sanctions might result if they disobeyed the
order to attend the hearing.
None of the plaintiffs nor Edmonson appeared at the February 23, 2006 hearing;
the defense duly appeared.  By order entered February 24, 2006, the District Court
ordered the plaintiffs and Edmonson to appear at a hearing on May 4, 2006, to show
cause why the case should not be dismissed for their failure to appear for the February 23,
2006 hearing.  The District Court also ordered the parties to be prepared to address the
    2 On March 22, 2006, Edmonson submitted a document seeking to have herself added
as a party to the matter.  By order entered May 3, 2006, the District Court denied the
request, noting that Edmonson was not a party to the proceeding, was not an attorney, and
had no standing to seek such relief.
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issue of whether the plaintiffs or Edmonson prepared the motion papers and pleadings in
the action, as well as to address the merits of their claim for fees and costs under the
IDEA.
Plaintiff Barnes filed a response to the show cause order, stating that neither she
nor the other plaintiffs would attend any hearings on the topic of unauthorized practice of
law, and that they refused to participate in further “delay tactics” in the matter.2  Instead,
Barnes urged the District Court to grant the originally-filed summary judgment motion. 
No appearance was made by the plaintiffs at the May 4, 2006 show cause hearing; the
defense duly appeared.  On May 5, 2006, the District Court dismissed the action under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with court orders.
Barnes appeals and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 
We review the District Court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) for abuse of discretion. 
See Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002).  To determine whether
the District Court abused its discretion, we consider how the court balanced the six
factors set out in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d
Cir. 1984).  The factors are (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the
extent of prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and to
respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party
    3 In considering the factor of prejudice to the Board caused by failures to respond to
discovery, the District Court noted in its dismissal order that the plaintiffs failed to appear
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was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal
including an analysis of those alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the
claim or defense.  Id.; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.  Not all factors need to be satisfied for
the District Court to dismiss a complaint.  Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 221
(3d Cir. 2003).  We recognize that the sanction of dismissal is extreme and should be
reserved for cases where it is justly deserved, but our standard of review is deferential. 
Id. at 221-22.
The District Court memorialized its Poulis findings in its dismissal order.  Upon
review, we find no abuse of discretion by the District Court in dismissing the case under
Rule 41(b).  Because the appellant proceeded pro se, she is personally responsible for her
failures to appear at the hearings.  See Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.  The appellant’s history
of dilatoriness and willful conduct is evident by her failure, twice, to appear at scheduled
hearings, despite the District Court’s orders to do so.  In fact, by way of her written
submissions, she unambiguously informed the District Court of her intent not to comply
with the District Court’s orders and not to participate in the proceedings as ordered. 
Nowhere in the record does it appear that Barnes ever made any attempts to comply with
the District Court’s orders or made any assurances that her compliance was forthcoming. 
The circumstances did not present an opportunity to consider an effective sanction other
than dismissal, or to consider the merits of the claims or defenses in the matter.3  In sum,
for the depositions authorized by its February 23, 2006 order, scheduled for April 26,
2006.  The record reflects that the Board mailed notices to take depositions to the
plaintiffs in care of Edmonson at Total Envolvement’s mailing address (the only address
apparently on file for the plaintiffs), but the record does not contain any documentation
verifying the failures to respond to discovery.  Thus, we do not consider this factor in our
analysis.
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we cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing the case.
Accordingly, because we find that the appeal presents no arguable issues of fact or
law, we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
